Publications & Accepted Articles

 

• Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs  (with N. Klein),                  accepted, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
• Size Matters – “Over”investments in a Relational Contracting Model  (with F. Englmaier), accepted, Economic Journal
• Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device (with H. Hakenes), accepted, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
• The Commitment Role of Equity Financing  (with V. Merlo, G. Wamser), forthcoming, Journal of the European Economic Association.
• Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts, 2017, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 33 (2), 301-331.
• Relational Contracts for Household Formation, Fertility Choice and Separation (with R. Rees, A. Wuppermann), 2016, Journal of Population Economics, 29(2), 421-455.
• Optimal Contracting with Private Military and Security Companies (with T. Hadjer), 2015, European Journal of Political Economy, 37, 220-240.
• On the Genesis of Multinational Foreign Affiliate Networks (with P. Egger, G. Wamser, V. Merlo), 2014, European Economic Review, 65(1), 136‐163.

 

Submitted Papers

• Long -Term Employment Relations when Agents are Present-Biased (with F. Englmaier, M. Schwarz), R&R, Journal of Labor Economics
• Inconsistent Time Preferences and On-the-job Search – When it Pays to be Naive (with R. Seibel)
• Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships
• Relational Contracts, the Costs of Enforcing Formal Contracts, and Capital Structure Choice — Theory and Evidence  (with V. Merlo, G. Wamser)

Current Projects

• The Effects of Information Sharing on Moral Hazard in Credit Markets – Theory and Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in the Philippines (with K. Czura, L. Spantig)
• Informal Incentives and Product Market Competition – How Digitalization Affects Production Efficiency, Firm Size, and Consumer Welfare (with T. Murooka)
• Relational Tax Evasion (with M. Troya Martinez)
• What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives Over the Course of Careers  (with A. Schade, K. Schüssler)